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Abstract 
 
The changes faced by the global rail industry in recent years have brought a redefinition of some of the 
traditional regulatory instruments available in this sector. This paper, focusing on price and quality 
regulation, discusses how these instruments have been applied in several countries where private sector 
participation in railways has been introduced mainly through concession contracts, and where some form 
of vertical and/or horizontal unbundling has been implemented. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After enjoying an unchallenged position for more than 100 years as the dominant 
means of transport, the rail industry has globally faced a dramatic change both in terms 
of economic relevance and organizational structure during the last decades. The decline 
of the railways has been partially explained by the government involvement in its 
management and the pervasive effects of an obsolete regulatory framework, which 
impeded, or at least slowed, the necessary adaptation to a changing environment 
dominated by more flexible transport alternatives. 
Narrowly classified as natural monopolies since the XIX century, railways’ 
management around the world widely relied on an undisputed model based on a 
vertically integrated firm, heavily protected from competition which acted as a national 
provider of a public service and received generous support from the Government. With 
very few exceptions, this was the paradigm until the 1980s, when a series of reforms, in 
the UK, Chile, New Zealand or Japan proved that competition could be introduced in 
this model through horizontal and/or vertical unbundling, and the subsequent increase in 
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private participation in the provision of services and, although less successfully, in the 
management of infrastructure. 
Within the traditional railway model, pricing and quality decisions were heavily 
regulated and political interference in managerial decisions often affected these aspects 
of the railway companies. In fact, pricing rules were relatively simple: in most cases the 
overall scheme was characterized by maximum prices with little connection with costs, 
combined with cross subsidization, through which some profitable services pay above 
their avoidable costs maintaining unprofitable services paying below their avoidable 
costs. Subsidies, not necessarily associated to public service obligations completed the 
picture. With respect to quality, few commercial provisions were in practice, since the 
Government-owned nature of most companies prevented them from making a real effort 
on improving this issue. 
For these reasons, the main aim of this paper is to discuss some of the new regulatory 
instruments on price and quality regulation that have recently become of common use in 
the countries which have opted for a change in their railway organizational paradigm. In 
section 2, we will first review the principles behind the price regulation mechanisms 
governing the provision of (mostly, passenger) services in a context of a possibly 
unbundled rail industry company enjoying a significant degree of private participation 
(usually, through a concession contract). In section 3, we specifically study in detail two 
of the major problems arising in the regulation of rail infrastructure, provision and 
access. Finally, since tariff controls can easily be cheated on quality grounds, quality 
requirements become essential for monitoring overall performance of rail 
concessionaires. We thus address the issue of quality regulation, including safety 
concerns in section 4; this includes not only the adequate definition of quality targets, 
but also a review of the most relevant mechanisms for quality control currently used in 
the rail industry. The final section describes some performance indicators that could be 
applied to monitor the behaviour of the regulated rail companies, thus providing a useful 
device aimed at moving from the definition of the regulation theoretical principles to the 
problem of how to implement them. 
 
 
2. Price regulation of rail services: principles and mechanisms 
 
According to standard economic principles, prices for rail transport services should 
match the opportunity cost of providing it in order to make the most efficient use of the 
economy’s resources. This is the economic efficiency or first best criterion which has 
defined the traditional regulation of the rail industry during the last fifty years. The main 
focus of government regulation was controlling market power by setting prices that 
limited the monopolistic abuse of any particular railroad. The exact form of tariff 
control (official approval of rates with little or no degree of financial autonomy) in each 
case depended on the nature of the industry, the ownership of the assets, the complexity 
of the regulated service, and the social and political pressures to maintain financial 
equilibrium in the medium and long run. 
In practice, however, opportunity cost pricing implies some measurement difficulties 
and often conveys economic losses, especially in industries with large economies of 
scale (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994). Therefore, this form of regulation was 
complemented by a number of standard price mechanisms that economic theorists 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 29 (2005): 22-45 
 24
devised to substitute the ideal efficiency criterion of pricing each unit of service at the 
exact cost of its provision.  
Price discrimination policies, either by type (student and senior prices, frequent 
traveller and commuter passes), number of consumers (group discounts), type or 
volume of freight (cargo rebates for some goods) or time of day or season (peak-load 
prices), have always been common in transport. The use of two-part tariffs, with fixed 
and variable components, is also a common tariff policy in which each unit of 
consumption (for example, a single trip) is priced differently. These mechanisms allow 
greater flexibility for railways and increase revenues without a great effect on costs. 
However, their social acceptability and information requirements can limit the extent of 
their application. 
In the new regulatory environment defined by the changes experienced in the rail 
industry since the 1980s, where separation of the infrastructure from services has been 
widely implemented in diverse forms, and a notable degree of private participation in 
rail management exists through, for example, concession contracts, pricing principles 
must be put into practice by means of concrete rules within the contract itself. 
In general, as private operators, rail concessionaires are allowed to set prices 
relatively freely, price regulation has a different nature: instead of price-setting, it 
becomes more price-supervision. To carry out this task, most concession contracts 
awarded in the rail industry (for example, in Argentina or Brazil) routinely include a 
specific procedure to control and evaluate the prices set by operators. These price 
control mechanisms are generally set according to three key factors: (i) the degree of 
monopoly power effectively conferred to the operator; (ii) the extent of government 
non-commercial objectives in the concession award procedure; and (iii) the possible 
existence of other limiting factors, such as intermodal competition. This latter element is 
relevant in rail freight operations (intermodal competition from trucking), but in the 
case of passenger traffic (especially commuter and regional), social pressure for low 
fares usually dominates many price interventions. In practice, the most common 
alternatives (second best criteria) for price control in rail concessions adopt the form of 
a rate of return regulation or a price cap mechanism. 
 
 
2.1. Rate of return mechanisms 
 
Rate of return regulation is used in railroads in Canada, Japan and the United States. 
The principle behind this type of regulation is to constrain prices so that the regulated 
rail transport operator earns only a fair rate of return on its capital investment. The 
regulator typically determines a revenue requirement based on a firm’s total costs 
during a test year, according to the variable costs and an estimate of the cost of capital 
to the firm, given by a “reasonable” rate level multiplied by a base rate (Liston, 1997).  
Thus, rate of return regulation has three components: the base rate, the allowed rate 
level, and the rate structure. The base rate refers to the investments that are allowed to 
earn a rate of return, the rate level refers to the relation of overall revenues to costs, and 
the rate structure determines how individual prices are set for different services or 
customers. Determining the first of these three components is often the most important 
regulatory task under this form of regulation, since inadequate calculations of the base 
rate may either jeopardize the survival of the firm or allow it to earn excessive profits. 
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In practice, the base rate usually includes most fixed costs less depreciation and working 
capital. 
Three characteristics should govern the definition of the asset base rate. First, with 
respect to the treatment of past investments carried out by the railroad before the 
regulatory period,1 it should be consistent and transparent in order to ensure that assets 
are not expropriated ex post by opportunistic regulatory behaviour, which would 
increase the cost of capital required by investors. Second, with future investments and 
expected operating expenditures and costs should be considered in the asset base 
definition inasmuch as they do not imply “excessive” investment and only when they 
are fully incorporated into the firm. Finally, with respect to current investments, a 
problem lies in determining the value of the firm’s capital. If the existing assets were 
transferable to other activities without cost, then the conceptual problem of determining 
their value would be simple: their replacement cost or resale value. At the other 
extreme, and more frequent in the rail industry, is that existing assets are sunk, so the 
opportunity cost of using them in their present activity is zero. If the regulator seeks 
maximum efficiency, it should ensure that the rate of return structure (and, indirectly, 
the prices) are set to cover future avoidable costs. 
Since most of the assets currently used by railways are financed before the 
concessioning process, both of these solutions are troublesome. Market values are much 
lower than replacement costs so this valuation would yield large price increases and 
windfall gains for private shareholders at the expense of consumers. On the other hand, 
in attributing a zero value to the existing assets, windfall gains would go in the opposite 
direction and the proprietors would be reluctant to finance future investments with such 
a lower real return. A possible way to address this problem is to use some average 
procedure that considers either a financial projection of what will happen with the future 
base rate or calculates indicative values by estimating the cash flows that the firm would 
have earned had the regulatory regime remain unchanged. 
Despite its advantages within the traditional price regulation mechanisms (mainly its 
simplicity), three additional problems are associated with this sort of regulation. First, 
there is little incentive for productive efficiency, since firms can pass production costs 
on to final users in the form of higher prices; second, it leads to excessive investment 
and capital use because the firm is guaranteed a return on investment;2 and, finally, the 
high degree of discretion enjoyed by the regulator in determining the base rate and the 
rate of return reduces the incentive for rent-seeking behaviour on the part of the 
regulated firm. 
 
 
2.2. Price cap regulation mechanisms 
 
The most common alternative to the standard rate of return regulation is the use of 
cost-plus incentives that, in practice, take the form of a menu of cost reimbursement 
rules that firms themselves select according to their preferences for sharing operating 
costs with the regulator. The basic aim of these mechanisms is the achievement of 
dynamic efficiency (in the sense of the regulated firm achieving the lowest unit cost in 
                                                 
1 This is often the case in many restructuring processes when a former state-owned railway transfers its 
assets to private concessionaires. 
2 This is the so-called Averch-Johnson or capital-bias effect, which is not particularly adverse in less 
developed economies whose capital needs are seldom fulfilled. 
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the long run) by sharing some of the efficiency improvement rents between the firm and 
the regulator.3 
Alternatively, price cap regulation is another incentive used in both railways and other 
privatized utilities. In its most standard form, it consists of setting traditional maximum 
price schemes based on long-run marginal costs in order to offer a firm an incentive to 
achieve the goal of dynamic efficiency while maintaining all or part of the gains 
associated with the firm’s future increases in efficiency. This mechanism came as a 
consequence of the criticism directed at the lack of cost minimization embedded in rate 
of return regulation and other traditional price regulation mechanisms. However, its 
efficiency gains have to be balanced with the higher information rents that it implies. 
There are a number of minor variations of the price cap system. In the rail industry, 
one of the most developed is the RPI-X formula. In this setup, the price for a basket of 
the firm’s prices can increase in any one year by no more than the increase in the retail 
price index (RPI) for that year, minus some fixed-cost (efficiency related) parameter X. 
In the case of multi-product activities, such as railways output, this expression can be 
easily adapted by requiring that a certain weighted average of percentage price increases 
not exceed the rate of growth of the RPI less X percent. The weight for each price can 
be defined according to the share in total revenue of each product or, alternatively, it 
can be imposed that the average revenue (calculated with accounting figures) can grow 
at most by RPI-X. Thus, the regulator can control the prices of multi-product firms by 
focusing on their revenues and correcting them according to adequate weights. It starts 
with a reference price, often calculated with rate of return criteria, and set the price for a 
fixed number of years. 
In the United Kingdom, for example, the price cap mechanism, in its RPI-X formula, 
has been applied to passenger traffic franchises. Commuter fares are regulated with 
respect to a basket containing all relevant fares, weighed broadly by the income that the 
operator derives from each. For three years from January 1996, increases in the capped 
fares are not permitted to be more than the retail price index increase from the 1995 
base price; after January 1999, the price cap was set at RPI-1%. 
The goal of this method is to increase the efficiency of the regulated rail operator, 
allowing the firm to earn substantial profits by improving efficiency while 
simultaneously financing current and future operations. This implies that, in practice, 
when setting the level of a price cap, the rail regulator must consider several factors: the 
cost of capital, the value of the existing assets, future investment programs, expected 
changes in productivity, estimates of demand growth, and, perhaps, the effect of X on 
actual and potential competitors. Some of these are common to other price regulation 
mechanisms and, in particular, they are needed when using rate of return regulation, as 
described above. 
There are different procedures and rules to deal with each mechanism. The cost of 
capital and the value of existing assets are calculated using standard financial 
techniques. The future investment program and its implications depends on both 
expected changes in productivity and estimated demand that can be obtained from 
econometric techniques or simpler projection and analysis of historical data. Finally, the 
                                                 
3 There are several ways to accomplish this goal and implement its results. For example, the sliding scale 
plans used in the United Kingdom’s Railtrack regulation consist of a price adjustment mechanism through 
which the actual rate of return earned by the firm is adapted to changes in productivity according to a 
variable parameter. 
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effect of the price cap on the future shape of the market is conjectured from past 
experiences or yardstick comparisons. 
One of the most critical issues is the setting and resetting of the productivity X-factor. 
A possible method consists of using indexes or indicators (as described below) to 
measure the difference between aggregate rates of growth of outputs and inputs and 
therefore calculate productivity from the residual. Econometrics also provides 
alternatives for estimating cost functions and their corresponding productivity 
parameters. Once the X-factor is determined, the initial price ceiling that is imposed on 
the firm after a switch of regime is critical. If the caps are too high, then too little 
surplus is transferred to consumers and deadweight losses are huge. If they are set too 
low, the firm may not be able to break even and may then have difficulty attracting 
capital, leading to a deterioration of quality of service. 
Another important element of RPI-X regulation is the existence of cost pass-through 
provisions, through which the firm can transfer to customers unexpected increases in 
certain factors outside of its control. Although these clauses are standard in the 
regulation of other utilities, they are not in the rail industry. The most plausible case 
could be given by energy costs, for which a certain percentage (100% or less) of the 
cost pass-through onto customers could be established in the concession contract. 
 
 
3. Regulation and rail infrastructure 
 
After reviewing the principles and mechanisms of price regulation for rail services, 
this section addresses the two most relevant problems of infrastructure regulation 
nowadays in a context of vertical unbundling and private participation. We first focus 
on the recovery cost problem and then study the issue of access pricing. 
 
 
3.1. How to recover infrastructure costs? 
 
Rail infrastructure provision and management are characterized by a high ratio of 
fixed to marginal costs, the existence of avoidable costs and unavoidable or common 
costs. Avoidable costs are uniquely associated with a particular output: if this output is 
not produced, no cost is incurred. This guiding principle relates to the idea of cost 
recovery for particular outputs. Avoidable costs may thus be considered as a floor to 
regulated prices (if any), since charging less than the avoidable cost is equivalent to 
operating at an economic loss. This makes standard pricing rules inoperable in this 
sector, since first best or efficient principles of marginal cost pricing may result in large 
deficits that jeopardize the long run survival of the firm. Three particular problems then 
arise with respect to the allocation of the rail infrastructure costs: cross-subsidization 
issues, cost-recovery problems, and the possibility of setting inefficient prices (Talley, 
1988). 
The existence of cross-subsidization problems in pricing rail services or infrastructure 
produced in the presence of common costs can be illustrated with the case of a profit-
regulated railroad connecting two large cities and also providing rail service to a smaller 
town along the route between the two cities. The fares charged for passage from the 
small town generate revenues exceeding the additional cost of serving it, such as 
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ticketing and station costs, but not sufficient to cover an equal or proportionate 
(however defined) share of the common costs, such as trackage, signalling, and 
trainyard costs. The issue is how to allocate common costs among customers and 
services. In many cases, cost sub-additivity and efficiency require joint production and 
allocation of fixed costs among all services, without cross-subsidization (accounting for 
externalities whenever present). 
Cross-subsidization is not only an equity problem for rail services, as in this example, 
but also a relevant issue for efficient pricing of infrastructure like railbeds, signals or 
stations. The standard procedure is the so-called fully distributed costs method, under 
which common costs are allocated on the basis of some common measure of utilization, 
such as gross tons/km, or other measure of relative output or gross revenue. 
Alternatively, common costs can also be allocated in proportion to costs that can be 
directly assigned to the various services (Braeutigam, 1989). The arbitrary nature of 
fully distributed cost methods and its lack of a conceptual foundation have been 
criticized, but they remain a useful measure for recovering common costs.  
However, the treatment of the cross-subsidization problem should not be based on 
excessively rigid criteria, particularly for developing countries with few alternative 
finance mechanisms. The analysis should be made on a case-by-case basis, since, for 
example, stand-alone cost tests do not apply if railroads are not allowed to abandon 
unremunerative facilities or services (Kessides and Willig, 1995). If that freedom is 
denied, a railroad cannot earn adequate revenues if its rates on potentially remunerative 
activities are constrained by stand-alone cost ceilings.  
The cost recovery principle should be a central issue in the design of any rail 
infrastructure pricing procedure. The theoretical and political debate focuses on two 
options. Many public firms still advocate the use of the efficient price mechanisms and 
propose marginal cost rules with the simultaneous use of public subsidies to cover fixed 
costs. Alternatively, a growing literature patronizes the use of full cost recovery prices, 
including price discrimination, multiple part tariffs or cross-subsidization schemes, if 
needed. Although it is thought that it might yield inefficient outcomes for the theoretical 
efficiency principles, it constitutes the second best available alternative in most cases. 
Similarly, with respect to access pricing of a rail network, it is clear that it should be 
based on marginal cost pricing rules in a first best world. In practice, however, the 
achievement of this objective is difficult due to at least three reasons: the above 
described cost structure of the rail network, which cannot always be recovered with 
simple price rules; the asymmetric information problem faced by the regulator with 
respect to these costs; and the subsidy level that can be sustained in the long-run. 
Several econometric studies have shown that in the case of the rail industry, the 
marginal cost of those railways that are still vertically integrated lies in the range of 
60%-70% of average cost; where rail services are separated from infrastructure, the 
marginal social cost of rail infrastructure alone often is well below the 60%-70% range 
(see, for example, Friedlander et al., 1993). Price discrimination, if feasible and 
politically acceptable, may help to raise cost recovery to around 60% of total cost 
without driving demand off the market. Thus, full cost recovery would require a further 
price mark-up of more than 60% above the efficient price. Alternative proposals, in 
terms of the so-called Ramsey pricing principle, have been defended for infrastructures 
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with high fixed costs and low marginal costs.4 However, they rarely work in practice, 
since they arouse consumers’ suspicions of unfair treatment and undue discrimination. 
Moreover, under Ramsey pricing rules all unattributable fixed and common costs are 
apportioned on the basis of the services’ demand characteristics.  
In the current debate, a reasonable conclusion is to advocate a balance between the 
cost recovery issue and the efficient pricing rules, giving preferential treatment to one or 
the other according to the case. However, the issue remains unsolved and depends on 
how different countries have faced their access pricing problem. Whether a country’s 
government is willing to assume these differences or not is, in most cases, a political 
question. In many cases, the ultimate challenge is how to price access to rail 
infrastructure in a transparent, efficient and non-discriminatory way. In Europe, for 
example, Directive 95/19 requires infrastructure managers to balance revenues with 
expenditures. In countries where revenues from operations and compensation from 
government for public service obligations are insufficient to provide a surplus for 
depreciation and investment, railways will be dependent on the state to fund or 
guarantee repayment of investment loans. This continues to be the case in many of the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
3.2. The access pricing question 
 
The development of tariffs for accessing rail infrastructure varies greatly among 
different countries according to the stage of their railway restructuring process. Some 
countries have already identified procedures for setting fees, and a number of them have 
laid down precise rules for the structure and level of fees. In others, business unit or 
infrastructure companies (either in public or private hands) are responsible for setting 
charges. In fact, access charges are mostly relevant in countries where traditional 
railroads have been vertically unbundled by the separation of the potentially competitive 
area of service operations from the naturally monopolistic area of infrastructure 
management. 
Apart from the already discussed problem of cost recovery, access pricing may create 
a market structure problem regarding its effects on competition and barriers to entry. 
This problem arises in network industries where a single, vertically integrated dominant 
firm (either private or public) controls the supply of a key input (in this case, railway 
tracks) to its competitors. It is obvious that in these cases, there are incentives for the 
firm to set prices high to raise rivals’ costs, but it could also be the case in which the 
regulator sets access prices too low in order to favour the entrants. 
Depending on the discretion allowed to the integrated firm, potentially distortive 
effects on access prices can be determined in several ways. First, when infrastructure is 
still publicly owned or managed, the regulator can determine the price as an integral 
part of the access terms defined in a contract with one of several private train operators. 
Secondly, the regulator may allow the firm to choose from a menu of alternative 
regulatory schemes, usually rooted in incentive-based price regulation mechanisms (to 
favour the firm that achieves higher levels of efficiency). Thirdly, the firm may have 
discretion over aspects of access pricing subject to some overall regulatory constraint, 
                                                 
4 Ramsey pricing refers to charging higher prices above unit costs to more inelastic market segments. 
When infrastructure and services are separated, their use becomes more complicated and still is not 
clearly solved, since different demands for services – as well as for tracks – must be estimated. 
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and finally, the firm may have full discretion over the price and is only restricted by the 
country’s anti-trust law. 
In all of these cases, there are two main approaches to setting access prices when the 
principles of cost recovery plus the normal rate of return are required. First, some 
countries use the current dominant paradigm for setting access charges: cost-related 
charges, which are based on the optimal first-best principle of pricing according to 
marginal cost (considered the forward-looking long-run incremental cost). The higher 
the proportion of common costs, the more complex the principle. It is based on the so-
called efficient-component rule, which determines that optimal access charge is equal to 
the direct cost plus the opportunity cost of providing access (given by the reduction in 
the dominant firm’s profit). To compute these costs, the regulator has to consider 
economic depreciation (physical depreciation plus technological progress) and forecast 
future usage. 
The first problem to be solved is that of the actual value of capital assets: nominal 
value versus potential to generate cash. While the latter is clearly a function of the 
privatization and regulation methods and the extent of competition envisaged in bidding 
for the right to operate concessioned infrastructure services, the former is more likely to 
reflect a past situation that domestic reforms are trying to overcome. 
The second method of setting access prices consists of developing usage-related 
charges. Once-avoidable costs are covered by increasing prices that are inversely related 
to demand elasticity. Another option (less controversial) is the use of a two-part tariff to 
avoid service cuts by train operators to save charges even when the network has no cost 
saving. The British infrastructure provider until 2001, Railtrack, is a well-studied 
example of how access prices functioned in practice. In a industry context where 
operating companies were franchised, Railtrack managed the infrastructure (track, 
signalling systems, electric power supply and stations) and was responsible for its 
maintenance, new investments and train operations (timetables, coordination, etc.). It 
also sold access to infrastructure to passenger and freight operators.  
Railtrack owned the rail network and set track charges that had to be agreed upon 
with the rail regulator under the criteria openly published in a number of regulatory 
policy statements. The price control system operated through a simple RPI-X formula 
that was revised every five years, remaining fixed between revisions. The structure of 
Railtrack’s access charges for passenger services was based on the usage-related 
charges and was made up of multiple-part tariffs with at least four elements. First, track 
usage charges, which tend to reflect short run effects on maintenance and the renewal 
costs of running trains of different types for different distances. Second, traction current 
charges, to recover the costs of electric current, varying geographically and temporally 
and reflecting distance covered and type of vehicle. Third, the long run incremental 
cost, which indicated the long run costs imposed on Railtrack in delivering the total 
access rights of a train operator. Finally, common costs, as the remainder of the fixed 
charge, designed to recover the rest of Railtrack’s costs at the sub-zonal, zonal or 
national level. This was apportioned among train operators on the basis of budgeted 
passenger vehicle miles for sub-zonal costs and budgeted passenger revenue for zonal 
and national costs. The first two elements amounted on average to only about 9% of 
total track access charges, and given the current structure of charges, these were the 
only elements that vary directly. The remaining 91% of the aggregate charge was in the 
form of a fixed charge, which did not vary with the number or type of trains run or with 
passenger revenue. 
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In the case of freight services, access prices were more flexible. The rail regulator had 
simply established several principles to be considered by Railtrack in its relationship 
with private operators. First, prices must cover the avoidable costs incurred by Railtrack 
as a direct result of carrying that particular freight flow; second, prices must be lower 
than the stand-alone cost that would be incurred by a national efficient competitor; third, 
no undue discriminatory charges are possible; and finally, charge structure should 
reflect the value to users of access to the rail network and enable Railtrack recover its 
total cost 
As opposed to the British case, the setting of access charges in other European 
countries is still underdeveloped. In 1995, the European Union passed two directives 
concerning the application of Directive 91/440 on the separation of infrastructure 
management and transport operations. Directive 95/18 regulated the licensing of railway 
undertakings, and Directive 95/19 established several general principles on the 
allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and infrastructure fee charges. These 
principles were designed to ensure an optimum, non-discriminatory use of infrastructure 
and guarantee an access charging policy according to EC rules, but they were received 
by member states with various degrees of enthusiasm. The objective of most 
governments that have set rules for infrastructure fees is to cover costs and differentiate 
fees to reflect different cost factors. In 2001 a new rail package clarified the principles 
on which rail infrastructure management should be based on and, very recently, through 
EC Directive 2004/51, the deadlines for implementing ‘third party access’ have been 
shortened (to January 2007). However, many of these changes have been slowly 
implemented in most countries. 
In France, for example, several principles were introduced to give access to railway 
infrastructure to licensed international groupings of transport services and operators of 
combined transport, but present arrangements seem more inclined to promote 
conventional international rail groupings rather than new entrants into the rail market. 
With centrally planned timetables, only the domestic operator pays a fixed amount to 
the (also public) infrastructure manager. User fees are fixed, accounting for a wide set 
of criteria including: infrastructure costs, the transport market situation, supply and 
demand characteristics, imperatives based on optimized use, and standard conditions for 
intermodal competition. In 2004 the access fee system was changed in several important 
ways. First, the access fees per unit of traffic were set two years in advance instead of 
essentially being negotiated after the fact. Second, the structure of the fees was changed 
to sharply increase fees for local passenger trains, freight, and ancillary services (such 
as stops in stations or the use of marshalling yards). Third, the projected total volume of 
fees was forecast to increase more gradually at a rate of about 300 million euros per 
year. 
Similarly, in Germany, the federal government owns the track infrastructure and is 
responsible for its preservation and for securing a certain level of public transport 
service by means of the Deutsche Bahn (DB), an independent joint-stock holding whose 
sole shareholder is the state. The infrastructure division of DB bears operating and 
maintenance costs and is in charge of stations, ticket sales, passenger attention, etc. It is 
also responsible for setting charges for track usage, which are supposed to cover all 
infrastructure costs, including investment. These charges are based on prices per 
train/km on the different line sectors, resulting in a number of different fee 
combinations (Häfner, 1996). 
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In Spain, the 2003 Railroad Law introduced charges for the usage of rail 
infrastructure, stations and other track elements that conform to EC Directive 2001/14. 
These charges intend to recover infrastructure’s full costs, and include four components: 
access, capacity reservation, circulation and traffic. The access charge is a general 
payment to be made by all licensed operators for the right to use the infrastructure. The 
capacity reservation and circulation fees depend on the kilometres of track used and 
vary with the type of service or train, the hour of the day and the characteristics of the 
track. Finally, the traffic charge is levied on the operators depending on the economic 
value of their service as measured by the number of seat-kilometres or ton-kilometres 
operated. 
 
 
4. Quality and safety regulation in the rail industry 
 
Quality performance is not neutral for the economic contribution of the rail transport 
sector to the social welfare. The particular level of quality achieved by train operators 
and particular features in regard to three main dimensions that broadly define quality in 
the rail industry (service, externalities and investment) critically determine the value 
added by this transport mode. The first question that naturally arises is why quality 
regulation is needed at all in this industry, and to what extent this regulation relates to 
the standard price regulation mechanisms described in the previous section. Economic 
theory provides a well-known argument to answer these questions: real world transport 
activities are characterized by market failures due to information problems. 
In an ideal world with a large number of competitive rail transport service providers 
and well-informed consumers of passenger and freight services, quality regulation 
would not be required since market forces would adjust consumer demand (in terms of 
prices, levels of output and of quality of service) to firm supply. If no price correction 
took place, less reliable rail companies would be driven out the market and only those 
whose price-quality ratios were in accordance with demand would remain. However, 
when full information doesn’t exist, markets cannot exert this disciplinary role on firms 
and purely competitive solutions do not always positively affect quality, prices, or 
output. Pure competition may result in unsafe, unreliable or unpleasant services since 
limited availability of resources and lack of adequate control mechanisms make it 
impossible to adjust consumer and producer interests. 
In the traditional organization of the rail industry some years ago, a monopolistic 
structure with a single firm providing services at the national or local level, price-quality 
adjustment problems may have increased since the monopoly’s privately optimal level 
of quality may not have coincided with social standards. Simple price regulation is 
seldom a solution. Any regulated, multi-product monopolist in an environment of 
asymmetric information tends to degrade quality in order to achieve higher profits once 
it enters the market. Railway firms are not immune to this temptation, for example, in 
terms of punctuality and cancellation standards. The quality outcome of any monopolist, 
not just in the rail sector, heavily depends on the specific regulation adopted. For 
example, with rate of return regulation, over-investing in non-required technological 
quality may accentuate the Averch-Johnson effect. Alternatively, with price cap 
regulation, a subtle cut in quality can be a very tempting way to cut costs (Carbajo, 
Estache and Kennedy, 1997). 
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Therefore, the price regulation mechanisms analyzed above are considered incomplete 
if they do not include quality provisions. This is not always easy, since adjusting price 
mechanisms by quality may render them inoperative or excessively difficult for the firm 
to manage or the regulator to monitor. Therefore, most regulators set quality standards 
or targets for train operators instead of correcting price control mechanisms. 
 
 
4.1. Definition of quality targets 
 
In setting up those quality standards incorporated in concession contract designs, the 
regulator often uses the principles of yardstick competition.5 These quality standards 
may be constructed at the national or regional level with inter-industry comparisons (as 
in Brazil and Chile for many of their public utilities) or by establishing international 
benchmarks or best practices (as in Australia for transport services and infrastructures).  
Three elements are considered in detail when designing this process. First, as in other 
transport modes, quality is mainly measured in service levels or specified service 
standards. However, this measurement is suited more for factors such as train 
punctuality, the reliability of services and the waiting time at stations or platforms, than 
it is for other factors.6 Simultaneously, the services provided before the transport itself, 
such as ticketing, reservations, and luggage or cargo handling are often ignored as part 
of the rail industry’s value chain, although they may constitute relevant aspects of both 
intramodal and intermodal competition. For these reasons, the first element to consider 
in designing a quality control in the rail industry is an integrated vision of transport 
service that includes not only the ride itself, but all aspects related to infrastructure 
(track and stations), stations and pre- and post-transport services provided to clients. 
A second aspect of quality regulation that is particularly relevant to railways is the 
flexibility with which scheduled services can be changed and new services introduced in 
response to changes in demand. Here, the rail industry has always been at a 
disadvantage to road transport because of the need to coordinate working timetables and 
operations with certain technical requirements due to the lack of alternative routes 
between points.  
Hence, it is not usually easy (with a few increasing exceptions in many countries) for 
rail transport to offer on-demand services to passengers (for example, as done by charter 
airlines) or freight customers (door-to-door services). Thus, coordination is relevant for 
quality of service regulation within the rail firms, and must also be considered in the 
design of the industry structure. For example, one potential disadvantage of the split 
between infrastructure and operations is that coordination might be even more difficult 
when changes have to be negotiated between different organizations, especially where 
timetable approvals also need to be secured from other train operators using conflicting 
train paths. 
Intermodal coordination with other industries is also necessary, since social quality 
performance is always evaluated in relation to feasible alternatives. Saturated corridors 
                                                 
5 This is done to avoid the problem of regulator’s capture and the discretionary nature of the regulatory 
action. However, there is a risk of making undue comparisons between different rail systems. 
6 For example, railway tracks can deteriorate with respect to the smoothness of the ride or the noise or 
vibration generated to passengers and third parties (buildings close to tracks) even though punctuality 
and/or safety are not jeopardized, so there may be an incentive to reduce maintenance standards in this 
respect. 
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(where investment in roads, railways and airports clearly overcomes demand) are a 
waste of resources that few economies can assume. This almost general equilibrium 
approach constitutes the third element of the quality regulation process, although it is 
not particular to this industry. The socio-political implications of quality regulation (in 
terms of equity or public service obligations and the social acceptance of quality 
standards) determine the overall targets to be established in each industry. 
 
Table 1: Quality dimensions of the rail industry. 
Dimension Definition Measurement Variables 
V
eh
ic
le
 
Onboard quality 
(wagons, locomotives) 
- Age of vehicle/number of years in service 
- Vehicle size and load factor 
- Availability of seats 
- Accessibility 
- Travel comfort 
     -  noise                - vibration 
     -  temperature     -  tidiness 
R
ou
te
 Route quality  
(travel of passengers  
and cargo) 
- Distribution and number of stations 
- Timetable: 
     - peak trains       - first-last train 
     - weekend-commuter services 
- Frequency (number of trains per hour) 
- Punctuality/reliability (waiting at stations) 
- Cargo services (reliability) 
Quality 
of 
Service 
 
Se
rv
ic
e Pre-transport and post-transport service 
quality 
(added value to service) 
- Ticket sales/reservations 
- Handling 
- Staff adequacy and competence 
- Inquiries and general information 
- Response to complaints 
External 
Quality 
Externalities 
(safety and environment) 
- Public service obligations 
- Safety procedures 
- Liability regimes 
- Environment protection (noise, pollution)       
- Congestion 
 
Taking into account these three characteristics, Table 1 summarizes the five most 
important quality dimensions for the railway industry (vehicle, route, service, social and 
dynamic quality) along with a number of standard performance measurement 
instruments for them. The first three (vehicle, route and service) are related to what is 
usually named (internal) quality of service, whereas the last one refers to externalities. 
 
 
4.1.1. Quality of service 
 
Regulation of the quality of rail transport services in regarding vehicle quality, the 
transport service itself (aboard trains) and the pre- and post-transport services has been 
dealt with in different depths in different countries although there is a positive 
correlation between the extent of the restructuring activity in the rail industry (in terms 
of private participation and/or separation of infrastructure from services) and the quality 
regulation requirement imposed on the industry post-restructuring. 
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In general, countries where the sector is still heavily dependent on government or 
public agencies (such as in Eastern Europe and Asia) have done less to establish 
separate quality control frameworks than in those where private participation has been 
significant (for example, the United Kingdom) and detailed quality control systems have 
been set up. In all cases, the basic principle governing the design of quality mechanisms 
is that customer service should be paramount if railways are to maximize profitability 
and compete with alternative modes of transport. The economic relationship between 
separate units in a railway enterprise should be structured to ensure the preservation of 
incentives to maximize customer service (see Swift, 1997a, 1997b).  
This is particularly relevant to the separation of infrastructure and operations. Vertical 
unbundling in railways distances infrastructure management from the end-user customer 
and could yield undesirable side effects or contradictions. For example, the density of 
traffic (trains per day) that maximizes returns on infrastructure investment is likely to be 
greater than the optimal level from the operators’ point of view. This is because at high 
densities, passenger service is likely to suffer due to congestion. Therefore, no matter 
whether the separation is institutional or only financial, mechanisms to compensate 
infrastructure units that run below optimal capacity must be incorporated into contracts 
in order to maximize end-user customer performance as a whole. Since the particular 
characteristics of the rail industry in each country require fine tuning of any regulatory 
or contract enforcement mechanism, Table 2 proposes a simple scheme that identifies 
and separates the roles to be assigned to the regulator and the operator (either 
franchisees or public or private monopolies) with regard to quality of service regulation. 
 
Table 2: Role assignment in railways quality of service regulation. 
Role Regulator Operator Both 
Design of adequate quality of service standards ✔ ✕ ✕ 
Level of application of these standards  ✔ ✕ ✕ 
Punishments, fines, sanctions, etc. ✔ ✕ ✕ 
Information to passengers about quality standards ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Variables to be controlled ✔ ✕ ✕ 
Inspection and reporting procedures ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Responsibility for achieving quality standards ✕ ✔ ✕ 
Risk sharing of service quality fluctuations ✕ ✔ ✔ 
Technical quality ✔ ✕ ✔ 
 
After its reform and the full privatization of services and track provision, the United 
Kingdom’s rail system constitutes one of the most practical examples of a detailed 
quality of service regulatory framework (see Table 2). For example, in the case of 
passenger transport, the regulatory agency (Office for Passenger Rail Franchising, 
OPRAF) defined what level of service is tendered for particular routes and corridors and 
sets the minimum level of service for every route in the country (not only timetable 
specifications, but also journey time, first and last departure times, etc.) If franchises 
operated a poorer service than specified then the OPRAF had the right to withhold the 
license. 
Operators awarded with licenses, Train Operating Companies (TOCs), are obliged to 
include in their timetable certain passenger service requirements set out in the franchise 
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agreement. These are the minimum standards of quality that operators need to achieve 
to ensure the basic provision of services. However, in order to avoid excessively 
limiting the freedom of the operators, these requirements do not specify detailed 
timetables for each route, but instead set parameters within which each company must 
design its own timetable. Passenger service requirements are set out by route and are 
largely based on the former British Rail timetable, specifying frequency of trains, 
stations to be served, maximum journey times, first and last trains, weekend services, 
through services, and load factors/peak train capacity (for commuter services). 
Passenger service requirements also include limits on the number of train cancellations 
and, where applicable, the level of capacity that needs to be provided. These limits 
apply in any 28-day reporting period, with three levels determined: (i) a call-in level, 
where OPRAF reviews the performance of the operator; (ii) a second level, where the 
operator is in breach of the franchise agreement, and (iii) a third level, which can trigger 
default of the agreement.  
For example, load factor requirement compliance is measured by the ratio of 
passengers exceeding capacity to the total number of passengers (PIXC). The maximum 
acceptable PIXC level is 3% for morning and evening peak together, or 4.5% for either 
peak considered alone. If extra capacity is needed to meet load factor specifications, the 
cost is shared by the operator and OPRAF according to the following criteria: (i) up to a 
certain capacity limit, the franchise payment does not change; (ii) between the initial 
limit and a second limit, OPRAF bears a share of costs, and (iii) above the second limit, 
all costs are paid by OPRAF. 
In practice, not all of the quality dimensions defined in Table 1 can be incorporated in 
the same proportion to any service quality mechanism. The British system mainly 
focuses on the route dimension and is based on their extensive experience with 
deregulation. When the role assignment proposed in Table 2 is not considered, or its 
components cannot be easily separated, several quality regulation failures may arise. 
The most important is the failure to define adequate independent quality measures. This 
is the case of several rail concessionaires in Argentina, where the level of vertical 
integration between the train service providers and the maintenance firms (in the form 
of subsidiaries or units integrating a larger industrial group) has distorted the incentive 
to provide the optimal price-quality ratio in favour of more frequent repairs and 
technical updates.  
 
 
4.1.2. Safety and externalities 
 
Regulation of the quality of service is only one of the two static aspects of quality 
regulation to be considered in designing a global framework for quality regulation in the 
rail industry. The social or external dimension of quality regulation, including all issues 
related to safety and externalities (pollution, congestion, etc.) must also be considered, 
and it specifically differs from level of service quality regulation in at least four aspects.  
The first element is the scope of regulation. Since non-compliance with social quality 
standards may affect users and non-users of transport services, these standards should 
always be exogenously set, by national or supranational legislation with intermodal 
implications, in the case of the rail industry. This is not always the case for timetables, 
load factors or vehicle size, variables that usually have simple intra-firm consequences. 
In the European railway industry, for example, three levels of quality regulation can be 
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found. Directive 91/440 determined the overall principles, and the obligation to comply 
was envisaged in mode-specific regulation (e.g. Railways Act in the United Kingdom) 
or in legislation that applies to all sectors of the economy (e.g. Health and Safety Act). 
The second factor that makes service quality regulation different from social quality 
regulation in the rail industry is that a regulatory approach must be used in the latter. 
Since the risks associated with accidents or potential environmental damages not only 
directly affect the private benefit, but also the social benefit of this transport mode, there 
is a need for an external regulator or agency to coordinate safety and reliability. This 
coordination is particularly important when firms move from a public to a deregulated 
system. Furthermore, in the rail industry, separation of infrastructure from services and 
the introduction of open access have made it necessary for a rail track controller to 
ensure safe coordination between different operators who are using the same tracks or 
stations.  
Again using the British railway system as an example, their safety regulator is the 
Health Safety Executive (HSE), which informs and advises the Office of the Rail 
Regulator (ORR). Operators of railway services, stations and networks must have an 
accepted safety case before the ORR approves their license. A safety case is a complete 
resource, control and management plan for delivering safety and defining safety 
procedures, organizations and systems. The private infrastructure provider, Railtrack, is 
required to have its own safety case, a fundamental component of which is Railtrack’s 
Safety Management System, which is a system of operational and technical standards to 
ensure safety and safe interworking in Railtrack’s infrastructure. 
The third aspect of particular interest to safety regulation in the railway industry is the 
assessment and assignment of risk. Given the inherent difficulties associated with strict 
monitoring, incentives exist for quality-regulated private providers of rail transport 
services to place compliance with safety requirements below the attainment of financial 
objectives. 
In fact, despite recent tragedies, railways traditionally have a good reputation for 
safety, a perception that converges with statistical proof in most countries. Therefore, 
one could conclude that safety levels and management are quite sufficient and no 
particular safety precautions or measures should be taken. However, public outcry, 
negative social effects and adverse public opinion from a single catastrophe, together 
with the persistence of regular fatalities (staff accidents, passengers joining and 
alighting trains, etc.) make it impossible for the regulator to avoid designing measures 
and policies to diminish individual and social risk.  
One of these policies relates to the compulsory insurance against third-party liability, 
since it may correct the operators’ incentives to take excessive risk. In Europe, for 
example, Directive 95/18 required that operators of train services must obtain, together 
with the operating license and path allocations, a safety certificate and insurance. The 
insurance arrangements in the privatized British railway industry provide another 
example of scope of liability cover: the basis and conditions for self-insurance. In this 
case, licenses for the private operators of railway assets (passenger trains, freight trains, 
stations, and maintenance depots) contain a condition requiring the operator to maintain 
insurance against third-party liability for licensed activities. The type, cover, level and 
identity of the insurer need the approval of the regulator, who sets guidelines on 
minimum insurance requirements that operators must meet. The operation of licensed 
activities without insurance approved by the regulator is considered a breach of the 
license. 
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Finally, the fourth element where service quality regulation differs from social quality 
regulation is externality issues and, in particular, those connected with the environment 
(engine pollution, noise, transport of hazardous goods, etc.) Again, in this case, social 
quality regulation should be concerned with rail operators’ internal and external factors, 
and should have several differences and similarities to other transport modes. 
For example, air pollution is one of the most regulated areas in the road and air 
transport modes, but is not a critical issue in the rail industry though, there are some 
notable exceptions in certain countries and routes. Noise pollution in suburban 
neighbourhoods, areas close to stations and depots and delicate countryside ecosystems 
has attracted more attention from both the public and regulators. Most countries, 
therefore, incorporate into their regulation the design and specification of measures to 
reduce noise produced by rolling stock and stationary sources (fans, compressors, and 
generators) and shunting noise. 
The final issues related to environmental regulation are measuring, analyzing and 
predicting the emissions of chemical substances (heavy metals, lubricants, dust, etc.) 
where railway lines are present and assessing the risk to the safety of local residents as a 
result of rail-related activities (transport of dangerous goods, explosions, etc.) In these 
cases, most countries subordinate their social quality standards and the role of their 
regulators to the overall technical principles emanating from supranational organisms or 
professional associations. Private and public rail transport operators are obliged to 
comply with national and supranational environmental standards. In Europe, for 
example, there are EC Directives on air pollution from vehicles that specify 
environmental standards for vehicle engines and fuel qualities which apply to both 
vehicles (wagons, locomotives) and transport operations. 
 
 
4.2. Instruments for quality control 
 
Once the objectives for service and social quality are well established, the next step in 
devising a quality regulation system for railways is designing control instruments. In 
principle, there are three alternative mechanisms for regulating quality in the rail 
industry.  
First, the firm can simply be required to publish and report measures of quality every 
pre-defined period. This information can also be made public to inform consumers 
and/or actual or potential rivals about the operator’s current performance. As in any 
other type of regulatory process, access to public information is a very delicate issue 
since it can serve as a disciplinary device for the rail provider and as a strategic 
instrument to undermine or strengthen the ability of the firm to survive in the market. 
A second quality control mechanism is including a direct, explicit measure of quality 
in the price control mechanism. For example, when subject to rate of return regulation, a 
rail service provider may be obliged to calculate its asset base according to certain 
average values and/or obtain authorization to carry out certain technological 
improvements in order to avoid overinvestment and make use of the Averch-Johnson 
effect. Similarly, under price cap restrictions, the basket of products whose average 
price increase is controlled by the regulator can be defined to avoid changes in quality 
(and consequently, cost reductions) that could be used by the regulated firm to increase 
profit, even if the same price caps are maintained. 
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The third mechanism that can be used to control quality is a customer compensation 
scheme, where grants or payments are awarded to people affected by non-compliance 
with quality standards. In practice, these mechanisms only work if quality failures can 
be easily verified. This requires a detailed regulation not only of quality standards, but 
also of monitoring rules and guarantees for both the regulator and the regulated that the 
inspection process will be transparent and objective. Moreover, if the compensation is 
distributed to consumers, either directly by the firm or through an intermediary body, 
sharing rules must be also defined. The practical difficulties associated with this quality 
control mechanism have made it common in many countries to instead specify 
minimum quality standards for certain parameters of the rail industry, backed by 
explicit legal sanctions that may include fines or the revocation or withdrawal of the 
operating license. 
 
Table 3: Instruments for quality control in the privatized rail industry. 
Regulation stage Instrument Additional characteristics 
- Pre-tender qualification  
Requirements 
- Experience  
- Financial strength 
- Technical ability 
- Specification of service  
characteristics in licenses 
- Routes and frequencies 
- Timetables 
- Vehicle capacities and load factor 
- Punctuality and reliability 
 
 
 
Stage I: 
Before entering  
The market 
- Specification of financing rules  
and investment plans 
- Investment plans 
- Fleet and track renewal rates 
- Quality of price-control  
Mechanisms 
- Rate of return regulation vs. Price cap  
Regulation 
- Information revelation obligation - Control of access to critical information 
- Audit processes - Internal and/or external 
- Company reporting - Frequency 
- Format 
- Regulator’s direct monitoring - Setup of monitoring mechanisms and rules 
 
 
Stage II: 
During market  
Operation 
- Technological control - Tacograph readings, electronic controls. 
- Incentive payments - Customer compensation schemes 
- Penalties - Fines for underperformance 
Stage III: 
After market  
Operation 
- Enforcement and binding rules - Contract withdrawal as a last resource 
 
Finding the adequate mix of these control mechanisms is often the most difficult task 
in the design of the quality regulation process. The approach followed by most countries 
is outlined in Table 3, with a summary of the most important instruments. Thus, the 
quality regulation process consists of three stages. First, before entering the market 
(Stage I), the goal is to anticipate and minimize future conflicts between the regulator 
and the concessionaire.7 Licenses must specify the expected characteristics of the 
service in terms of, for example, routes and frequencies of trains or timetables. For 
passenger services, particularly in the case of urban and suburban trains, vehicle 
                                                 
7 To achieve this, pre-tender qualification requirements can be used in order to ensure a minimum level of 
technical and practical expertise and financial solvency, as described in the previous section. 
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capacities and punctuality can also be set. Finally, in order to not forget the dynamic 
dimension of quality described above, Stage I must also specify investment plans and 
financing rules. Afterwards, during market operation (Stage II), instruments for quality 
control in the rail industry should mostly be related to the direct monitoring of the 
firm’s performance. Thus, this is the time to introduce quality incentives in price-
mechanisms, to establish the firm’s obligation to reveal information and the auditing 
(external or internal) processes to be carried out. In most cases, the use of technical 
control instruments (such as tacographs or track electronic controls) complements the 
standard instruments. Finally, after the transport activity has already occurred (Stage 
III), compensations or punishments can be implemented according to any of the 
schemes described above. Both penalties and incentives must be graded according to the 
expected future evolution of the relationship, since severe fines or large subsidies may 
alter the behaviour of the operator in the market. 
 
 
5. Performance indicators 
 
Performance indicators are used in the rail industry to monitor the behaviour of one or 
more regulated firms in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulatory measures to 
which they are subjected.8 The main advantage of these indicators or indices is that they 
provide a periodical assessment and control of the firm’s activity and continuously 
update information, simply, quickly, and at a relatively low administrative cost for the 
regulator.  
The most important disadvantage of performance indicators is that their use is only 
valid when comparisons (whether between different firms or the same firm over time) 
are constructed on a similar basis. For inter-firm comparisons, the companies must 
belong to countries with similar characteristics (e.g. the participation of transport in the 
economy as a whole, the degree of economic development, or the regulatory 
framework, etc.). For intra-firm comparisons, indicators must account for external and 
internal changes produced during each period (e.g. new management, changes in 
demand, etc.) 
Comparisons across companies usually provide interesting, persuasive results that can 
help the regulator set objectives and design future license contracts. However, extreme 
care should be used in drawing normative conclusions from these results. What 
constitutes a benchmark of desirable practice for some objectives may differ among 
companies. For example, countries with very liberalized frameworks in their rail 
industry (the United States, for example) could set desirable productivity indicator 
levels (or quality of service) that clearly differ from the levels in other more regulated 
frameworks (such as in Europe). 
Similarly, simple indicators should be carefully interpreted over time to avoid 
contradictions and inappropriate measurements. For example, when assessing railway 
output, the number of trains/km may be relatively high, while passengers/km or tons/km 
may be relatively low (if the firm specializes in one type of traffic). Given this conflict, 
overall performance can be ambiguous. The most practical solution is to jointly interpret 
                                                 
8 For example, quality indicators can be established in a contract and reviewed regularly to confirm that 
the terms of the license are being fulfilled. 
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the indicators and the objectives that they serve. For example, a service quality 
objective, such as the number of trains per hour, may conflict with both financial 
objectives, reflected in a high cost recovery rate, and objectives based on the 
maintenance of low prices. 
Thompson and Fraser (1996) point out that monetary and productivity variables 
should be carefully defined for inter-firm comparisons. Fares, wages, outputs and inputs 
vary widely among countries for a large number of reasons that are not necessarily 
related to the firm’s operations, but to measurement or statistical errors. For example, 
average passenger fares are based on the overall mix of passenger classes (each with a 
different price). Tariffs are often higher per passenger/km for short trips than for long 
ones, and they must also depend on the existence of government subsidies or artificial 
compensations. Similarly, common freight tariff mistakes include not accounting for the 
different mix of commodities, size of shipment or length of haul. The latter also affects 
passenger traffic and is particularly relevant since some costs (ticketing, billing and 
station maintenance, for example) are fixed with respect to the length of the trip but 
vary with size or distance. 
These difficulties are increased when measuring productivity, since a simple 
comparison among partial measurements of output cannot capture the complexity of 
relationships or the variety of productive structures that take place within a rail operator. 
For example, a commonly used productivity indicator, the number of passengers/km or 
tons/km per employee,9 depends on such diverse factors (e.g., regulatory environment, 
structure of the labour market, availability and quality of infrastructure, alternative 
transport modes, etc.), that it could be seriously misleading if interpreted without care. 
To elude these sorts of problems, the construction of performance indicators should 
avoid excessively simple data management, and use statistical techniques that account 
for the different relative environments of each company. Oum and Yu (1994), for 
example, estimated different efficiency levels for a sample of OECD railway companies 
by introducing internal factors (such as the characteristics of outputs) and external 
factors (difference in the legal and regulatory framework between companies).  
Despite these difficulties, a large number of indicators are commonly used to monitor 
the performance of firms within the rail industry around the world. The definition of 
each particular indicator depends on its objectives and its informative value.  
Several external factors that vary widely from country to country and firm to firm 
substantially influence comparisons. Therefore contextual indicators assist in 
comparative analysis and define desirable performance levels. They include social and 
economic characteristics of the railways as well as other elements associated with the 
economy as a whole. Directed mainly at the regulator, they control for the exogenous 
factors in inter-firm and intra-firm comparisons. Table 4 presents several examples from 
international statistical sources.10 Simultaneously, there are many indicators 
(particularly those for prices and quality of service) that are informative to transport 
users and provide input for the regulator's control tasks. Jointly with the contextual 
indicators, these management indicators provide the necessary instruments to judge the 
management and behaviour of the company, and can be grouped at three different 
levels, summarized in Table 5. 
                                                 
9 The term employee can also refer to terminal staff, administrative staff, train crew or maintenance staff. 
Similarly, capital can be disaggregated into trains, wagons, terminals, platforms, routes, etc. 
10 In particular, the International Union of Railways (UIC) publishes a yearly summary of the main 
statistics of its affiliated railways, although not all of them are always available for all railroads. 
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Table 4: Contextual indicators in the rail industry. 
Type Examples 
 
 
Overall economic activity 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
Urbanization degree 
Industry structure 
Energy costs 
Private cost of capital 
Transportation sector importance 
Participation of transport in GDP 
Intermodal market share (passengers and freight) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall rail sector indicators 
• Output 
Passenger trains/km  
Freight trains/km 
Passengers/km 
Tons/km 
• Revenues  
Passenger revenue 
Freight revenue 
• Network indicators 
Length of line 
Length of track 
Electrified track (%) 
Route/km/km2  
• Density and service 
Train routes/km per capita 
Trains/km per routes/km 
Average size of shipment 
Average length of haul 
• Organization of the industry 
Regulatory agencies (number) 
Separation of infrastructure and services (type) 
Access and entry system (type) 
Regulatory and institutional system 
State involvement in economy (in % of GDP) 
Tax and Judiciary system (corruption index) 
 
Some final practical rules that could be helpful in this process are as follows: (i) each 
indicator should have at least a function or objective, (ii) the relationship between each 
indicator and its objective must be clear and direct, although (iii) multiple objectives can 
be addressed by multiple indicators (jointly interpreted); and finally, in order to assure 
the utility of the indicators, (iv) appropriate data must be provided and (v) the 
management of the indicators’ information should be part of the regulatory process. 
For the regulator, price indicators can be a control mechanism over the activities of 
the operators, despite the difficulties mentioned. This control may be established not 
only in terms of the comparison between companies with similar characteristics, but 
through monitoring over a period of time. In any event, the regulator must ensure that 
any variation in price corresponds to a proportionate variation in costs or level of 
efficiency. The operational and efficiency indices therefore are instruments that help the 
regulator. Improvements in company productivity and efficiency levels combined with 
increases in price levels are clear signs of abuse of market power on the part of railway 
operators. 
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Table 5: Management indicators in the rail industry. 
Type Examples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commercial 
• Prices 
Average passenger fare (revenues per passenger/km) 
Average freight price (revenues per ton/km) 
• Quality of service 
Average train-speed (in passengers and freight) 
Delayed arrivals or departures (as % of scheduled) 
% of lost or damaged freight 
Average passenger load factor 
Traffic density (trains per hour) 
• Pollution and safety 
Rate of fuel usage (per train/km) 
Level of noise 
Level of emission of pollutants 
Number of accidents or incidents 
 
 
 
 
 
Operational 
• Labour productivity 
Passengers/km per employee 
Tons/km per employee 
Passenger trains/km per employee 
Freight trains/km per employee 
Total trains/km per employee 
• Capital productivity 
Number and kms. travelled by locomotives  
Locomotive availability (in %)  
Tons/km per wagon/km 
Wagons/km per wagon 
Tons/km per wagon 
 
 
 
Financial 
• Efficiency 
Costs per employee. 
Costs per unit of capital 
Unit cost (per passenger/km, ton/km, train/km) 
• Profits 
Revenues/costs 
Subsidies 
 
Indicators of service quality that were earlier presented should serve the same way as 
price indices to establish evaluations of different companies, as well as dynamic or time 
evaluations. These measurements should be analyzed together with price indices 
because of the possibility of finding different feasible combinations of price and service 
quality. For example, a high number of trains per hour, i.e. a high traffic density, could 
only be financed by means of high prices. 
The simultaneous implementation of control systems for prices and service quality 
may limit the firm management and reduce operability. Placing an emphasis on price 
control or service quality depends on whether it prefers to offer services at the lowest 
possible price, or offer services with certain standards of quality. All of these indicators 
allow the regulator to monitor the operators’ activities as defined in Phase II of Table 3. 
Unjustified or systematic breaches of quality standards (insufficient number of trains 
per hour, lack of punctuality, unreliability, very high indices of load factor, etc) should 
be accompanied by an appropriate system of penalties, as described above. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has reviewed the theoretical foundations to regulate prices and quality 
service levels in the rail sector. Also the paper describes how the current changes in this 
industry have provoked the necessity to modify the old mechanisms to control prices 
and quality decisions. The institutional separation between infrastructure and 
operations, the horizontal unbundling process and the increasing contribution of private 
participation have promoted the introduction of novel and new regulatory systems. But 
the definition and the application of these systems present problems and difficulties 
which must be appropriately evaluated. The elaboration of a suitable list of measures or 
indexes which allow to monitor the performance of the industry is crucial in order to 
reduce these problems.  
 
In conclusion, there is no unique form of rail regulation to address these new 
challenges, but the general rule is to maintain flexibility and simplicity whenever 
possible. Two key issues in the new regulatory environment of the rail industry are that 
private participation is included in license contracts and the organization of the industry 
is adapted to each country’s needs and characteristics. In turn, using these mechanisms 
also changes the role of the rail regulator, whose actions should now be governed by 
principles that foster competition and market mechanisms and simultaneously provide a 
stable legal and institutional framework for economic activity. The regulator should 
refrain from intervention unless the ultimate goal of achieving economic efficiency 
subject to the socially demanded level of equity is in jeopardy. 
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